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KENTUcKY LAW JOUPNAL
C. D. Herme, Inc. v. R. C. Tway Co.,12 in which the Kentucky court
accepted the MacPherson doctrine in negligence cases. Even though
Kentucky has adopted the MacP herson doctrine, which might indicate
a trend toward abolishing privity in the implied warranty cases, the
federal court was required to apply the present Kentucky law.
Several recent decisions have held privity of contract not to be
necessary to an action for breach of implied warranty.13 To what
extent will Kentucky follow these decisions? Kentucky's adoption of
the Uniform Commercial Code in 1960 removed the privity require-
ment under certain circumstances. The Code gives members of the
family, household, or guests of the buyer a direct action against the
seller.14 However, the manufacturer-consumer relationship of the
principal case is not affected by this provision.15 Unless the com-
plaining party can bring himself within a specific Code provision, he
must satisfy the privity requirement under present Kentucky case law.
Yet, present economic and social conditions indicate that the more
enlightened view would be to drop the privity requirement. In this
age of advertising, the consumer purchases goods in reliance upon the
manufacturer's ability to produce them free of defects. Kentucky
should extend the express or implied warranty not only to the buyer's
family, household, and guests, but also to the subsequent buyer. The
manufacturers would become more defect conscious and the public
would be guaranteed safer products. Furthermore, manufacturers
are more able to sustain loss and spread the loss throughout society as
a cost of production.
Larry Garmon
ToRTs - Comm3muroY NEGLIGENcE - P oX _ATE CAUSE - "BUT FoR"
RuILE.-Plaintiff pedestrian brought an action against the defendant
motorist to recover for injuries sustained by the plaintiff when struck
by the defendant's automobile at an intersection. The trial court
instructed the jury that if the plaintiff violated any of the duties im-
posed upon him and if such violation on his part caused or helped to
bring about the accident and the resulting injuries, then the law in this
case is for the defendant. On the basis of this instruction the jury
found for the defendant. Held: Reversed. The use of an instruction
12 294 S.W.2d 534 (Ky. 1956).
'3 Spence v. Three Rivers Builders and Masonry Supply, Inc., 853 Mich. 120,
90 N.W.2d 873 (1958); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161
A.2d 69 (1960).
14 KRS 355.2-318.
15 Uniform Commercial Code § 2-318, official comment 3.
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which did not advise the jury that negligence on the part of the
plaintiff must have been a proximate cause of the accident was error.
Travis v. Hay, 852 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1961).
The majority rule on this point is that the plaintiff will not be
barred unless his negligence was the proximate cause of the injury.1
The Kentucky court, however, has been astonishingly inconsistent on
this point. For the most part, it has rejected the proximate cause test
and stated that if the accident would not have occurred "but for" the
plaintiff's negligence, regardless of whether it is the proximate cause,
the plaintiff will be denied recovery.2 On the other hand, the court
has on occasion employed the proximate cause test without any men-
tion of the "but for" rule.3 Nevertheless, the court declared in the
Travis case: "It is the rule in this state that to constitute contributory
negligence exempting the defendant from liability the plaintiff's negli-
gence should be a proximate and not a remote cause, efficiently con-
tributing to the injury or damage."4
The court asserted in the Travis case that standard procedure has
been to point out to the jury the requirement that the plaintiff's negli-
gence be proximate as contrasted to remote by the employment of the
phrase that but for such negligence the injury would not have
occurred. Although in an earlier decision the court expressly re-
pudiated the "but for" rule, stating it was necessary that the plaintiff's
negligence be a proximate cause of the injury,5 the court in the Travis
case appears to have reverted to a modification of the "but for" rule
in referring to the "standard procedure."
This "standard procedure" equates the "but for" and proximate
cause rules by defining proximate cause in terms of the "but for" rule.
This is precisely the impression the court gave in the Travis case when
it said: "The use of the 'but for' clause in an instruction precludes a
jury from finding against a plaintiff who has been negligent, but which
negligence did not contribute as a proximate cause to the happening
of the accident."
The court is saying, in effect, that to determine whether the
12 Harper & James, Torts § 22.2 (1956); Morris, Torts 218 (1953).
2Acres v. Hall's Adm'r, 253 S.W.2d 373 (1952); Louisville & N. By. v.
Hyde, 289 S.W.2d 936 (1951); McCarter v. Louisville & N. By., 314 Ky. 697 236
S.W.2d 933 (1951); Norfolk & W. By. v. Bailey, 307 Ky. 386, 211 S.W.2d 154
(1948); Price v. T. P. Taylor & Co., 302 Ky. 736, 196 S.W.2d 312 (1946); Smiths
Adm'r v. Ford Motor Co., 202 Ky. 706, 261 S.W. 245 (1924).
3 Allen v. Dillman, 249 S.W.2d 23 (1952); Chesapeake & 0. By. v. Pope, 296
Ky. 254, 176 S.W.2d 876 (1944); Martin v. Chesapeake & 0. By., 273 Ky. 32,
115 S.W.2d 306 (1938).
4 352 S.W.2d 209, 211 (Ky. 1961).
5 Chesapeake & 0. By. v. Pope, 296 Ky. 254, 176 S.W.2d 876 (1944).
6352 S.W.2d 209, 211 (Ky. 1961).
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plaintiff's negligence was a proximate cause of the accident, it must
be determined if the accident would not have occurred but for his
negligence. This only compounds the confusion. Undoubtedly con-
tributing to the use of the "but for" clause is Commissioner Stanley's
approved instruction for contributory negligence cases, which also
combines the proximate cause and "but for" tests.
7
Apparently, the court is uncertain of the definition of proximate
cause in contributory negligence cases. Should it be defined in terms
of the "but for" rule as the court most frequently does? An argument
against its use is that the "but for" test breaks down where there are
two contributing causes. This is precisely the situation in all con-
tributory negligence cases. If two independent causes concur to
produce a result which either of them alone would have produced,
each is a cause in fact of the result though it would have happened
without either cause.8 There are situations, to be sure, where the
plaintiff's negligence is the sole cause of the injury, but in such a case
there is neither need nor room for the doctrine of contributory negli-
gence. If the plaintiffs negligence is the sole cause, the defendant
would not be negligent, since causation is a requisite for negligence.
Contributory negligence is invoked only when the negligence of both
the plaintiff and defendant are contributing proximate causes of the
injury.9 Likewise, the plaintiff's negligence should not be regarded as
the proximate cause merely because the plaintiff was the last wrong-
doer or the last acting efficient cause.' 0 Each of these theories is
incorrect, and in most instances works an injustice on the plaintiff.
Therefore, it is strongly urged that the court discard the "but for"
rule outright, and in all contributory negligence cases determine
whether: (1) the plaintiff's negligence is a contributing factor in
producing the injury; and, if so, (2) if it is a proximate cause of the
injury.
As long as the contributory negligence doctrine is to prevail, it
should be applied properly and uniformly." With that in mind, it is
recommended that the "but for" rule be deleted from the approved
instruction in the Travis case, and a new instruction be promulgated
and approved, patterned rigidly on the proximate cause test in terms
7 2 Stanley, Instructions to juries in Kentucky § 602 (2d ed. 1957).
82 Harper & James, Torts § 20.2 (1956).
9 Id. at § 22.2.
3.0 Id. at § 20.6.
11A few jurisdictions have adopted the comparative negligence doctrine
where the degrees of negligence of both parties are taken into consideration, and
the plaintiff's recovery decreased proportionately if his negligence is correspond-
ingly less than the defendant's negligence. A number of attempts have been made
to adopt the comparative negligence doctrine in Kentucky, but all have failed.
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of risk theory. Therefore, the plaintiff would not be barred unless his
injury was a possible result within the risk to which the plaintiff had
subjected himself. This is a more exact method of determining the
plaintiff's negligence, and would give the trial judge and jury more
precise standards by allowing them to weigh the plaintiff's act in
relation to the risk created.
William G. Kohlhepp
CmnwNAL PnocEm'Ri.-S.amH PwoR To ARBEs.-The defendant was
walking down a deserted street in the heart of New York City at
8:15 a.m., carrying a shotgun. When questioned about the gun by
two police officers, he replied that he was going hunting. The officers,
after discovering that the gun was loaded, ordered the defendant to
accompany them to the police station for further questioning. While
putting the defendant into the patrol car, one of the officers touched
the defendant's clothing, and felt an object about the size of a pistol.
A formal search revealed that the defendant had in his possession a
pistol, a tear gas gun, and two knives. He was then arrested and two
charges were filed against him, one relating to the shotgun, the other
to his possession of concealed weapons. The charge relating to the
shotgun was dismissed. The defendant moved to suppress the evi-
dence that was taken from him on the ground that it was obtained
by an illegal search before the arrest. Held: Motion denied. Since
the officers had probable cause to believe that a criminal act was
being committed in their presence, they were "authorized to arrest
the defendant or to search his person incidental to such an arrest."
People v. Salerno, 285 N.Y.S.2d 879 (1962).
The United States Constitution' and all state constitutions 2 have
provisions which afford protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures. To give effect to this protection, the Supreme Court has
ruled that all federal3 and state4 courts must exclude evidence
obtained by such unreasonable searches. Thus, the issue in the prin-
cipal case was whether a search made by officers prior to an arrest,
upon probable cause that a crime was being committed in their
presence, was unreasonable.
1 U.S. Const. amend. IV.
2 E.g., Ala. Coast. art. 1, § 5; Alaska Const. art. I, § 14.
3 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).4 Mapp v. Ohio, 867 U.S. 643 (1961).
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